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This paper makes two important contributions. Firstly, it uncovers some of the main
economic determinants driving the dynamics of public education spending in
Europe. Drawing mainly on the insights provided by Baumol’s cost theory, the
baseline specification uses unit labour costs and real GDP per capita as its main
determinants. Some important institutional rigidities are also highlighted. The results
confirm the fast relative increase in education costs, exposing the long-term
affordability challenge of public education investment. Secondly, by including a
policy objective and translating the empirical specification into a decision rule, the
paper touches on some less mentioned determinants, such as policy commitment.
Unfortunately, there is only weak overall evidence that public education spending
would increase in response to a lack of progress in the policy objective. Finally,
policy implications are discussed.
JEL: D78, H41, H52, I22
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1 Introduction
The sustained rise in the relative cost of certain public services continues to be a major
source of concern for societies and governments alike. The problem has been first
observed and discussed in Baumol and Bowen (1966) and Baumol (1967), with sectors
such as education and health-care being given as prominent examples. Baumol (2012)
further explains that the pain experienced by a society seems to be caused mainly by
the relative dynamics of these costs rather than their levels (see also Wolff et al., 2014).
In fact, this problem has been so pervasive across both the developed and the develop-
ing world, and over the last couple of decades, that it has been commonly labeled as
the (Baumol’s) ‘cost disease’. Obviously, such a persistent and widespread phenomenon
must have roots that go deeper than country-specific characteristics and institutional
arrangements.
I start from these considerations when empirically analysing a panel dataset that
spans over the 2000–2012 time period and refers to current European Union (EU)
member states. In this data environment, I intend to highlight some common determi-
nants driving the dynamics of public education spending and to draw insights with re-
spect to their policy importance. I also focus on spending dynamics rather than levels
since this allows me to address some large heterogeneity concerns in my sample. I
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construct an empirical specification building on theoretical insights borrowed mainly
from Baumol (1967) ‘cost model’, but also from Bowen (1980) ‘revenue theory of costs’.
Using just aggregate measures of unit labour costs and income per capita, I am able to
capture the sustained rise in education costs (and therefore spending), despite the iner-
tia observed in classroom ‘production technology’ (measured by student-teacher ratios).
Relevant studies employing similar approaches to model education spending can be
found in Fernandez and Rogerson (2001), Gundlach et al. (2001), Archibald and
Feldman (2008), Wolff et al. (2014), Chen and Moul (2014). In general, their findings
largely confirm the theoretical underpinnings discussed above. In fact, the Baumol’s
cost theory in particular has been an excellent workhorse for empirical investiga-
tions in many closely-related areas, such as health-care, general services, and other
labour-intensive activities.
The paper also touches on some less mentioned determinants of education spending
that bear more with political economy considerations, such as policy commitment.
Here, I discuss commitment with a focus on public education spending (at primary,
secondary and tertiary levels), although extensions to other policy areas (e.g., employ-
ment and social security) remain possible within the same methodological approach.
The understanding is that, beyond theoretical determinants and inherent institutional
rigidities, there will always be some degree of policy discretion (as opposed to time-
consistent policy rules that define commitment) that would amend funding allocations
due to some specific considerations. As a prerequisite to evaluating policy commit-
ment, I expand my empirical specification to include a policy-relevant education object-
ive and attempt to establish a link between the progress registered in this objective and
the dynamics of spending (which I take to be the policy instrument). Lisbon strategy
(or Europe 2010) together with its current, more detailed, Europe 2020 version were
designed to promote education attainment and social cohesion, raise employment and
foster innovation along with other long-term policy objectives.1 Hence, I draw on these
two policy agendas in search of some well-defined, consistent indicators to serve as pol-
icy objectives for my analysis. With respect to education, there is only one clear and
measureable policy objective mentioned in both strategies: reducing the share of early
school leavers (henceforth ESL), i.e., 18–24 year-olds with less than upper secondary
educational attainment who are no longer in education or training —according to the
definition of the European Commission.2 In this context, I investigate whether EU gov-
ernments have shown determination in their pursuit for better education goals, i.e.,
lower ESL shares; for a positive characterization of policy commitment, I expect public
education spending to increase whenever there is a lack of or insufficient progress with
respect to the ESL policy objective.3
The paper makes at least two important contributions. Firstly, it empirically identifies
some of the main common determinants driving the dynamics of public education
spending in Europe, building on some well-established economic theories. The paper
provides clear evidence that the annual growth rate in public education spending (espe-
cially at primary and secondary levels) has considerably exceeded the annual growth
rate in unit labour costs—a preferred measure for portraying the Baumol ‘cost disease’
and an indicator of general price trends. Unfortunately, this finding also exposes the
long-term affordability challenge of public education investment. A system of seemingly
unrelated regression equations is proposed to account for any possible substitutions or
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complementarities between different education levels. Moreover, by broadening the
perspective, I show that the dynamics of total government spending per capita can also
be easily described by relying on the same major determinants as in the case of educa-
tion spending per student (a recent empirical review on public spending determinants
can be found in Shelton, 2007). In addition, the paper highlights some dimensions where
institutional rigidities are higher and can, therefore, generate highly persistent dynamics in
public education spending (e.g., student-teacher ratio, spending share of teachers’ wages).
Secondly, the paper attempts to empirically evaluate the link between education
spending and education attainment, where the latter is defined in terms of early school
leavers—a highly relevant policy objective according to the strategies promoted by the
EU. In establishing such a link between the two elements, the analysis touches on the
issue of policy commitment to education. Commitment here implies a very clear se-
quencing of the decision-making process: spending is adjusted or decided with respect
to previous/past realized performances in the policy objective. Unfortunately, I am not
able to find sufficiently strong evidence that policy commitment has been a major
determinant of education spending across EU states, although this finding is clearly
dependent on the specific approach adopted here.
This analysis also has implications for other closely-related strands of research. On the
one hand, education is known to foster technical progress and productivity growth that,
in turn, provide not only resources to fund more education but also the right incentives to
inspire better education choices for the young generations.4 The possibility of such a virtu-
ous circle highlights the importance of education investment due to its favourable conse-
quences on several socio-economic dimensions, including better career prospects, faster
transition from school to work, and higher social mobility. On the other hand, education
usually represents a small allocation in total government spending, much smaller than
other, more pressing, policy objectives such as employment and social security. In fact,
short-term political considerations might dominate the public budgeting process today,
especially given the high and persistent unemployment levels in Europe. However, if edu-
cation costs were to continue rising faster than general prices, the governments would be
forced into a difficult trade-off between the long-term affordability and provision of public
education and the short-term political considerations arising from more pressing objec-
tives.5 In the end, although the cost disease ‘turns out to affect only the way we divide the
money we spend’ (see Wolff et al., 2014, p. 19), this might not be too comforting for gov-
ernments that need to deliver on seemingly conflicting policy objectives.
The paper is organized as following. Section 2 discusses the theoretical foundations
of the paper. The data and the main empirical specifications of the model are presented
in section 3. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and their policy implications.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
As a theoretical basis for this modelling exercise, I draw mainly on two well-established
economic theories. The first theoretical strand rests on the seminal work of Baumol
and Bowen (1966) and Baumol (1967), who propose an ‘unbalanced growth’ model to
explain the dynamics of an economy consisting of two sectors: a ‘progressive’ one,
and an ‘un-progressive’ or ‘stagnant’ one. The second theoretical strand relies on Bowen
(1980) and his ‘revenue theory of costs’ formulated in relation to higher education.
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The main assumption behind the first theoretical approach is that labour productivity
grows in the long-term only in the ‘progressive’ sector, which is usually identified with
the manufacturing or, more generally, with the good-providing sector. Beyond the un-
disputed statistical evidence, several arguments can be put forward to support the claim
that manufacturing is more likely to enjoy higher levels of productivity growth over the
long-term. Labour productivity, defined as output per worker, generally grows as a re-
sult of technological progress and innovation, increased capital per worker, economies
of scale, etc. Being highly exposed to international competition, the manufacturing sec-
tor is forced to innovate to retain competitiveness. A second argument is that new
technologies can more easily be incorporated into physical capital and equipment,6 and
the manufacturing sector is known to be more capital-intensive than other sectors.
Lastly, economies of scale are more easily observed in the case of good-producing
industries that can benefit from the automatization of routine tasks. When identifying
‘non-progressive’ sectors, Baumol cites education and health-care as two highly labour-
intensive sectors, where labour productivity does not generally grow in the long-run.
The basic idea is that labour-intensive industries cannot use technology as a leverage to
increase productivity as much as capital-intensive industries do. However, nominal
wages in both sectors grow at the same rate over the long-term, mainly because the
two sectors are competing for the same pool of workers.7 Due to long-term nominal
wage convergence between the two sectors, lagging productivity growth in the
non-progressive sector will put upward pressure on the relative costs in that sector.8
Baumol assumes that both sectors produce final goods and services (i.e., no intermediate
products) according to the following production functions:
Ymant ¼ a  Lmant  exp rtð Þ
Y edut ¼ b  Ledut ;
where man is an index for the ‘progressive’ sector and edu is the index for the ‘stagnant’
sector, Y denotes the real output, L is the labour input and a,b are constants. Notice
that the progressive sector grows at the exogenously given rate r, which is the growth
rate of the technological progress.
The nominal wages in the two sectors grow at the same rate as the technological progress,
i.e., Wt =W * exp(rt). Consequently, a prediction of this theory is that the relative cost per









¼ a=b  exp rtð Þ→
t→∞
∞; implying
that the ‘stagnant’ sector might vanish in the long-run. In fact, depending on demand elasti-
city, customers might not tolerate an ‘infinite’ price increase, and therefore some products
might even disappear from the market or retreat to luxury niches (Baumol cites expensive
restaurants or famous theaters as relevant examples). However, in the case of necessities
such as education or health-care, price elasticity is very low, and therefore higher costs will
be passed-through into higher prices, causing an ‘unbalanced-growth’ dynamics between
the two sectors in nominal terms.
Baumol imagines two extreme scenarios. The first scenario assumes that the rela-
tive output (or consumption) of the two sectors, i.e., Ymant =Y
edu
t ; is to remain con-
stant in real terms. Under the constraint that labour supply is fixed and given by
L ¼ Lt ¼ Lmant þ Ledut ; this additional assumption would imply that the labour share of the
‘non-progressive’ sector will constantly grow over time, such that Ledut¼∞ ¼ Lt¼∞: Since wages
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tend to converge in the two sectors, this also implies that the relative expenditure share of
the stagnant sector will keep rising indefinitely (in nominal terms). The second scenario is
just the reverse of the previous one: assuming that relative expenditures in the two sectors
stay constant in the long-term, the consequences are that the relative output will grow in
the ‘progressive’ sector, but its employment share will remain constant. In reality,
because of the uneven dynamics of productivity and wages in the two sectors, the
share of expenditures allocated to the non-progressive sector will raise over time—some-
thing that has been coined in the literature as the (Baumol’s) ‘cost disease’.
Despite some inherent critiques, this modelling setting has been a fruitful avenue of
research in the literature analysing the dynamics of the education sector (see Gundlach
et al. 2001; Archibald and Feldman, 2008; Wolff et al., 2014; Chen and Moul, 2014), the
health-care sector (see Hartwig, 2008; 2011), and the more general service-providing
sector (see Sasaki, 2007; Nordhaus, 2008). Recently, Baumol (2012) appears to favour
an alternative explanation of his theory where the ‘cost disease’ might be more of a ‘cost
utopia’ if higher costs in the non-progressive sector are simply driven by higher
demand (in contrast to the more supply-side determinants outlined in the original
theory), which in turn is supported by the higher income generated in the progressive
sector (Chen and Moul, 2014).
Probably not far from this alternative interpretation provided by Baumol (2012), the
second relevant literature strand rests on Bowen (1980) and his insights with respect to
drivers of education costs, in particular, higher education costs. Bowen argues that
available revenues are the only constraint on how much to spend on education. In his
view, schools maximize ‘education excellence, prestige and influence’, only facing a rev-
enue constraint. To provide and empirical support for his theory, Bowel points at both
the increase in disposable income and the increase in education costs experienced by
the developed countries over the last decades (see also Kane, 1999; Fernandez and
Rogerson, 2001; Archibald and Feldman, 2008). It should be noted however that this
second explanation of raising education cost looks less appealing from a theoretical
perspective, resting mainly on available empirical evidence at that time.
In addition, one may consider the political economy models that regard the prefer-
ences of the median voter (see Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995, 1996, 1998; Gradstein
and Justman, 1997; Gradstein, 2000; Easterly, 2001; Benabou 1996; 2002). According to
these models, households’ income distribution play a key role in the public support for
education, mainly because inequality with respect to education opportunities could be
mitigated through fiscal policy means (e.g., taxes, transfers). The median voter would
be willing to support the public budget through paid taxes, and as a consequence, the
dynamics of public education costs over time will be a direct function of voters’ dispos-
able income. While I do not specifically attempt to estimate such models here, their in-
sights might be useful to frame the policy discussion later, especially with respect to
affordability of public education and policy trade-offs.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Data
The main data source on education spending is Eurostat, i.e., the government finance
statistics section (COFOG, based on the ESA95 standard), and covers the time period
2000–2012. This source contains only general government spending for all major
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public domains, including education; due to its limited coverage, it excludes other im-
portant sources of funding for education, especially private sources (e.g., funding pro-
vided by households), but also foreign sources (e.g., funding by international
organizations). I also use data on education drawn from the OECD/UNESCO/Euro-
stat joint data collection and covering the time period 2000–2012. The data is orga-
nized according to the International Standard Classification System of Education or
ISCED (on a scale from 0 to 6) developed by UNESCO in 1997. In addition, all other
relevant macroeconomic indicators used in the empirical section are taken from the
European Commission AMECO database (downloaded in January-February 2015)
maintained by DG ECFIN. As a general remark, however, the resulting panel is
slightly unbalanced due to data availability issues, with longer time-series available es-
pecially for older EU members.
In empirical studies comparing variables and indicators (in levels) across countries,
there seems to be a widespread agreement to use purchasing power parities (the PPS
standard). However, as discussed in the introduction, in order to better address the
policy implications and concerns with respect to the long-term affordability of rising
education costs, I focus on the dynamics of spending (see Baumol, 2012; Wolff et al.,
2014). Therefore, all the variables employed in this paper are in (log) first-differences.9
I provide three more (technical) reasons for such a choice: (i) avoid potential non-
stationarity issues in the empirical estimation, (ii) reduce the influence of some methodo-
logical breaks in the available time-series, and (iii) mitigate the impact of time-invariant
country-specific factors that dominate the education spending data in levels, reflecting
cultural, historical and political differences.
Using data in first-differences also allows me to avoid any potential pitfalls with re-
spect to a lack of empirical evidence on the causality link between education outcomes
and financial resources/spending, as extensively discussed in Hanushek (2003). In his
influential study, Hanushek advocates for the need to improve school and teacher’s
characteristics rather than to increase spending.10 Specifically, he highlights factors
that would mostly reflect country/school-specific characteristics, including autonomy
over curriculum, accountability, teacher’s knowledge of the subject, etc. These indica-
tors do not have adequate time-variation to be considered relevant for my modelling
purposes (e.g., PISA surveys conducted by the OECD every 3 years are not easily com-
parable over time). Public education spending, however, is part of a policy decision-
making process and subject to public scrutiny on a much more frequent basis, in con-
trast to other structural policies that might address the qualitative aspects discussed
above. Accordingly, the approach presented in this paper can be considered to account
for these qualitative factors but in a rather uninformative way, i.e., by using data in
first-differences.
OECD recommends using data expressed in national prices as there is no need to
convert variables in PPS and, thus, introduce additional variability caused by relative
price movements (see Ahmad et al., 2003). I will follow this advice in my empirical
analysis, which is presented in the next sections.
3.2 Model specification
The specification of the model describing the dynamics of public education spending is
built in three steps.
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In a first step, I draw on the theoretical insights provided in the previous section and
set up a ‘baseline’ model specification using only the main economic indicators
highlighted in section 2 and denoted here by economicI. I follow a rich empirical litera-
ture taking an empirical perspective on the Baumol’s theoretical model (see Gundlach
et al., 2001; Hartwig, 2008, 2011). Accordingly, the annual change in the ‘non-progres-
sive’ sector’s expenditures is modelled as a function of changes in unit labour costs
(ULC)—simply computed as nominal wages over labour productivity. While some au-
thors have used sector-specific variables,11 the lack of available time-series does not
allow me to follow this route. Instead, I use the aggregate indicators, corresponding
to the whole economy, much as in Hartwig (2008, 2011), where a similar approach
is used to investigate health-care spending.
Besides ULC, I include real GDP per capita, which I take as the main economic
determinant according the second theoretical strand that relies on the Bowen
(1980) and his ‘revenue theory of cost’. As noted by Archibald and Feldman
(2008), the analytical framework formulated by Bowen is less appealing because it
lacks clear theoretical foundations. However, GDP per capita is one of the most
used indicators in empirical studies on education and is an excellent candidate to
control for any remaining heterogeneity.12 Moreover, the GDP per capita would
also adequately control for demand-side effects, where higher income generates
higher demand for education services. A stylized version of the ‘baseline’ model
specification is given below:
Δspendingi;t ¼ f ΔeconomicIi;t
  ¼ f ΔULCi;t ; ΔGDPpercapi;t
 
ð1Þ
where spending denotes the amount of public funding devoted to education, Δ denotes
the log-first difference of the indicator and f is a general functional form specification.
The subscript t is a time index, while i is a country index, both common notations in a
panel setting.
In a second step, I enrich the ‘baseline’ model specification to include additional
controls. These controls are supposed to reflect the large heterogeneity existing in
education systems across the EU in terms of how they are organized, what are the
most important institutional rigidities, and other relevant dimensions. Beyond
organizational aspects, education spending can be ultimately related to the number of
teachers and students, classes and schools; in the short-run these figures cannot be
easily changed, thus, worsening institutional rigidities. Teachers are the most import-
ant resource in the production of education and their wage bill represents the biggest
single contributor to total public education spending. The relative inertia in classroom
‘production technology’ implies that student-teacher ratios are highly persistent too.
In addition, any foreseen changes in the quantity/quality of existing infrastructure
(schools and/or classes) are part of a multi-annual planning process and will be
reflected in persistent capital expenditures, which represent the third most important
contributor to total public education spending.13
Moreover, my list of potential controls is severely limited by data availability on a
yearly basis. In line with the discussion above, I use the following indicators: the share
of teachers’ wages in current education spending, the share of capital expenditure in
total education spending, class size and student-teacher ratios.14 The additional
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controls introduced at this step are generally denoted as structureI. I formulate my
model as in (2) and label this the ‘extended’ model specification:
Δ spendingi;t ¼ f Δ economicIi;t ; Δ structureIi;t−1
  ð2Þ
The one year lag assumed for the indicators reflecting the structure of education
spending captures the inherent persistency in its dynamics. It can be easily argued that
the number of available teachers and number of classes and schools do not significantly
change over the timeframe of 1 year (at least not in a regular way that can be captured
in a typical time-series regression analysis). However, over a longer timeframe these in-
dicators will eventually change for different reasoning: demographics dynamics, policy
considerations, etc., and therefore the need to control for their influence.
As a third and final step, I include the registered progress in the education policy ob-
jective as an additional regressor. This would establish a direct link between the dynam-
ics of education spending (which can be seen as the policy instrument) and the
movements in the policy objective, allowing thus an empirical characterization of the
policy commitment. As discussed in the introduction of the paper, I consider that the
relevant policy objective consists in reducing the share of early school leavers. The most
general formulation of the empirical model in its ‘full’ specification is given below:
Δ spendingi;t ¼ f ðΔeconomicIi;t ; Δ structureIi;t−1; ΔobjectiveIi;t−1Þ; ð3Þ
where Δ objectiveI denotes the progress registered in the policy objective and its 1 year
lag is required to expose the policy decision rule consistent with commitment to educa-
tion. In my empirical setting, commitment implies a very particular sequencing of the
decision-making process: the instrument is adjusted only after observing the progress
registered in the policy objective.15 The 1 year lag might be simply justified by data
availability: spending decisions are taken with a forward-looking perspective, but are
based on readily available statistical data, which usually refer to some previous
period (higher lag orders might be needed if the time gap in data availability is
assumed to be longer).
I adopt a system-estimation approach meaning that, for each main education level, I
specify an equation describing the dynamics of spending at that particular level, i.e., pri-
mary (including pre-primary), secondary and tertiary; accordingly, the corresponding
groupings based on the ISCED classification will be: ISCED 0–1, or ISCED 2–4, and
ISCED 5–6, respectively. Latter, I will include a fourth equation describing the dynam-
ics of total public spending as a way to acknowledge the existing budget constraints. I
estimate the system using seemingly-unrelated regression methods (SUR) to get un-
biased and efficient estimates of the coefficients. There are two main arguments that
support the system-estimation approach. The first argument rests on the characteristics
of the policy decision-making process in public finance, i.e., all decisions are interre-
lated and simultaneous. A second argument is that all the estimated equations will in-
clude at least one common regressor, i.e., ULCs and, eventually, GDP per capita. The
inherent assumption behind a SUR estimation method is that the residuals of the indi-
vidual regressions included in the system are all correlated (i.e., not independent). Ac-
cordingly, I always report the Breusch-Pagan test of independence in my results: a
rejection of the null (i.e., independence) means that the SUR method is appropriate for
estimating the model.
Dragomirescu-Gaina IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:25 Page 8 of 24
All the data used in the estimation is in nominal terms, local currency, per pupil/student,
and expressed in full time equivalents (FTE).16 The use of spending per pupil/student
adequately captures all relevant demographic dynamics; accordingly, the model does not
need to include demographics as a separate regressor, thus, saving valuable degrees
of freedom in the estimation. A similar argument can be made with respect to the fourth
equation, which specifies the dynamics of total public spending in per capita terms.
4 Empirical results
4.1 A three-equation system
The first thing that needs to be checked is whether the theoretical framework discussed
in section 2 is validated by the data. Indeed, for all ‘baseline’ and ‘extended’ specifica-
tions presented in Table 1 below, the coefficient of the unit labour cost, i.e., the wage-
productivity differential or simply the ‘Baumol’ variable, is always significant in all three
equations of the system. Moreover, the constant term is also highly significant, espe-
cially at primary and secondary levels (for tertiary education the results are more mixed
since the constant term is not always statistically significant). This finding confirms the
faster rise in education costs relative to the rise in ULCs—a common proxy for captur-
ing broad inflationary pressures in (most new-Keynesian) economic models. It also re-
veals the most often advocated solution to the ‘cost disease’ problem: since only wage
growth in excess of productivity gains would be fed into higher education costs. This
suggests productivity growth as a possible long-term remedy (see Wolff et al., 2014).
When comparing the ‘baseline’ with the ‘extended’ specification, however, there ap-
pears to be a drop in the estimated ‘Baumol’ coefficient. The drop seems substantial in
the case of pre- and primary (ISCED 0–1) and tertiary education levels (ISCED 5–6),
but it must be associated with the introduction of the (lagged) share of teachers’ wages
as an additional control in the regression.17 This suggests that the share of teachers’
wages is an important determinant—an additional nominal driver of public education
costs, though certainly carrying a different content than the ‘Baumol cost’ variable.18
The ‘extended’ specification includes the additional controls discussed in section 3.2.
For the specifications reported here, I use student/teacher ratios instead of class size
due to better data availability. The pupil/teacher ratio (only averages over aggregated
ISCED 1–3 levels are available from Eurostat) is highly significant and the estimated
coefficients are all negative, pointing at the relevance of this indicator for cost analysis.
Adding real GDP per capita as an additional regressor to either ‘baseline’ or ‘ex-
tended’ specifications does not significantly change the estimated coefficients for ULCs.
However, it does improve the overall fit of the model (i.e., the R2 increases when adding
GDP per capita). As evidenced in Table 1, adding GDP per capita seems no more than
a better way to control for some remaining country-specific factors (probably not en-
tirely removed after first-differentiating the data). Indeed, the specification illustrated in
column (5) replaces the GDP per capita with country-specific dummies, which deliver
an expected improvement in the overall fit of the model. However, the specification
with GDP per capita is preferred by the Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criter-
ion (BIC), with both being larger in the ‘extended & country dummies’ compared to
‘extended & GDP per capita’.
Section 2 has provided an extensive discussion on the relevant mechanisms behind
the dynamics of education spending; yet, these theoretical mechanisms are assumed to
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Table 1 Estimates for public education spending per (FTE) student













Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δlog (spending per student, FTE, at
ISCED 0–1) [eq1]
Δlog (ULC) 1.18*** 1.11*** 1.00*** 1.03*** 0.93*** 0.66***
(7.00) (6.96) (4.94) (5.22) (4.30) (3.01)




Δlog (pupil/teacher ratio) (−1) −0.16 −0.12 −0.11 −0.12
(−1.26) (−0.92) (−0.79) (−0.95)
Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.07** 0.05 0.06* 0.06*
(2.15) (1. 35) (1.89) (1.90)
Δlog (share of teachers’ wages
expenditure) (−1)
0.45** 0.46** 0.55*** 0.37*
(2.24) (2.36) (2.64) (1.92)
Constant 3.48*** 2.31*** 4.27*** 3.26*** 4.17 4.89***
(4.70) (3.17) (5.28) (3.89) (1.46) (6.05)
Δlog (spending per student, FTE, at
ISCED 2–4) [eq2]
Δlog (ULC) 0.69*** 0.64*** 0.61*** 0.64*** 0.43* 0.31
(3.93) (3.74) (2.79) (2.97) (1.88) (1.28)




Δlog (pupil/teacher ratio) (−1) −0.33** −0.29** −0.35** −0.30**
(−2.36) (−2.07) (−2.40) (−2.11)
Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04
(1.28) (0.72) (1.12) (1.05)
Δlog (share of teachers’ wages
expenditure) (−1)
0.47** 0.48** 0.58*** 0.41*
(2.20) (2.29) (2.65) (1.92)
Constant 3.71*** 2.84*** 3.98*** 3.03*** 3.42 4.54***
(4.82) (3.63) (4.56) (3.32) (1.14) (5.15)
Δlog (spending per student,
FTE, at ISCED 5–6) [eq3]
Δlog (ULC) 1.11*** 1.06*** 0.80*** 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.70***
(5.90) (5.75) (3.75) (3.88) (3.50) (2.90)




Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.07** 0.06* 0.07* 0.07**
(2.12) (1.65) (1.78) (2.02)
0.46** 0.46** 0.55** 0.43**
Dragomirescu-Gaina IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:25 Page 10 of 24
work mainly over the long-term. When exploring data with an annual frequency, richer
dynamics might be revealed. I rely on the empirical literature to provide some needed
guidelines in my investigation. Humphreys (2000) and Delaney and Doyle (2011)
among many others find strong evidence that business cycles affect government finan-
cial support for higher education. Although primary and secondary education are
compulsory and, therefore, should not be too much subject to short-term policy con-
siderations, I will include ‘output gap’ as an additional regressor (i.e., proxy for business
cycle) for all levels of education considered. However, I had to remove GDP per capita
from this specification (depicted in column (6) in Table 1) to avoid colinearity due to
the high correlation between the two indicators; it is interesting to observe that the
Baumol coefficient drops significantly or even losses statistical significance in some
cases. This finding points to the fact that the output gap and the ULC might both
reflect similar information, such as the gap between demand (proxied by the wage
component of the ULC) and supply (proxied by the productivity component of the ULC).
To select the most parsimonious specification, I rely again on AIC and BIC information
criteria. In this case, both parsimony measures (AIC and BIC) prefer the specification that
includes GDP per capita (column 4) to the one that includes output gap (column 6).
4.2 A four-equation system
Within the broader context of public budgeting, education spending represents only a
minor allocation of public financial resources. According to Eurostat, at the aggregate
level of the European Union (EU), education makes up for a little bit more than 10% of
total government spending. Over the 2000–2012 period this percentage has varied sig-
nificantly across EU member states, from a minimum of 6% in Greece to a maximum
of 19% in Estonia. Given this allocation problem, there is a need to account for the
existing general public budget constraints when modelling the dynamics of education
spending. The Appendix discusses some additional reasons to append a fourth equation
to the initial three-equation system.
Table 1 Estimates for public education spending per (FTE) student (Continued)
Δlog (share of teachers’ wages
expenditure) (−1)
(2.16) (2.22) (2.37) (2.04)
Constant 0.56 −0.39 1.70** 0.90 −0.29 1.89**
(0.68) (−0.46) (2.00) (1.00) (−0.09) (2.17)
Observations 247 247 206 206 206 206
R2 [eq1] 0.17 0.26 0.18 0.22 0.28 0.22
R2 [eq2] 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.25 0.14
R2 [eq3] 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.13
AIC 5474.48 5440.62 4570.36 4556.55 4635.34 4560.56
BIC 5495.53 5472.20 4616.95 4613.12 4911.55 4617.14













Note: The R2 is a summary measure of the overall in-sample predictive power of the model; it is simply computed as
1-residual sum of squares/total sum of squared residuals. The null of the Breusch-Pagan tests is that the residuals across
the estimated equations in the model are independent
Country dummies are not shown in specification (5)
Standard errors are adjusted for small sample sizes. t statistics are given in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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To address this aspect, specification (7) in Table 2 below presents a four-equation
system, where the forth equation describes the dynamics of the general public spending
per capita. The initial three-equation system has already addressed the possibility of
reallocations (through correlations) between the three relevant education levels: pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary. Now, within a four-equation system, the possibility of
reallocation between education and other areas of the public budget is also addressed
(e.g., spending on economic affairs, military and defense are all substitutes to public
education spending, etc.).
The empirical specification of this fourth equation is intentionally kept simple.
Baumol’s theory can be easily extended to include all publicly-provided services (same
assumptions are needed), while income per capita is one of the most relevant determi-
nants for general government spending (see Shelton, 2007). Accordingly, the same two
theoretical determinants outlined in the previous sections are included. The coefficients
of the first three equations of the system remain basically unchanged between specifica-
tions (4) and (7). Interestingly, the fourth equation has a higher explanatory power than
the other three, despite relying on just two determinants and a constant term; the
constant is statistically significant, though smaller in absolute value than in the case of
primary and secondary levels. Other advantages pertaining to specification (7) over
specification (4) are highlighted in the Appendix.
Despite all the existing budgetary constraints, some of them arising from the
strict EU institutional governance framework, there has always been some degree
of domestic policy discretion that could change a given spending allocation due to
specific considerations. I intend to reflect the commitment idea using the ‘full’
model specification, which is portrayed by equation (3) from section 3.2. I am
making the implicit assumption that policy commitment implies a very clear se-
quencing of the decision-making process: current changes in spending allocation to
education are decided based on past performances. Compared to the ‘extended’
specification, I now include an additional regressor in each of the three initial
equations of the system. In principle, lagged changes in the policy objective (or
similar transformations thereof – see below) should represent relevant measures of
past performances. Given the definition of the policy objective,19 a rising share of
early school leavers would reflect a worsening of the situation, while declining ESL
shares reflect an improvement (i.e., the lower the ESL shares, the better). Accord-
ingly, a truly committed policy-maker would increase spending today (and possibly
over the next periods) to counterbalance any unfavourable past developments in
the ESL objective. Similarly, a policy-maker could be allowed to reduce spending
today if past ESL progress is considered as satisfactory.20
In reality, different EU countries could make different spending allocations despite
registering a similar ESL progress; likewise, countries could behave similarly (i.e.,
increase/decrease education spending by the same percent) despite witnessing very
different ESL developments. Given the large diversity in ESL performances21 across
the EU members, there is a need to introduce some relevant benchmarks or reference
values in order to adequately evaluate/measure the progress registered in the policy object-
ive for a given country. Despite some inherent simplifications, I present three ways to
achieve this goal and illustrate the results in Table 3 below, namely in specifications (8), (9)
and (10).
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Table 2 Estimates for public education spending per (FTE) student
SUR estimates for the model specifications: Extended & GDP
per capita
Extended & GDP per capita
-adding general gov’t expenditure-
Specification (4) (7)
Δlog (spending per student, FTE, at ISCED 0–1) [eq1]
Δlog (ULC) 1.03*** 1.04***
(5.22) (5.29)
Δlog (real GDP per capita) 0.64*** 0.65***
(3.49) (3.57)
Δlog (pupil/teacher ratio) (−1) −0.12 −0.03
(−0.92) (−0.22)
Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.05 0.05
(1. 35) (1.57)




Δlog (spending per student, FTE, at ISCED 2–4) [eq2]
Δlog (ULC) 0.64*** 0.65***
(2.97) (3.01)
Δlog (real GDP per capita) 0.60*** 0.61***
(3.02) (3.06)
Δlog (pupil/teacher ratio) (−1) −0.29** −0.24*
(−2.07) (−1.73)
Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.03 0.03
(0.72) (0.72)




Δlog (spending per student, FTE, at ISCED 5–6) [eq3]
Δlog (ULC) 0.82*** 0.82***
(3.88) (3.88)
Δlog (real GDP per capita) 0.49** 0.49**
(2.48) (2.48)
Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.06* 0.06*
(1.65) (1.65)




Δlog (general govt. spending per capita) [eq4]
Δlog (ULC) 0.70***
(6.96)
Δlog (real GDP per capita) 0.47***
(5.05)
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 Firstly, I use the lagged change in ESL as the easiest way to include a feedback
mechanism into my specification, which states the policy decision rule dictating
how current spending is adjusted. This specification corresponds to column (8) in
Table 3 below and is labelled as ‘own lag’ because progress in the ESL objective is
measured against its own lag. The intuition is that a policy-maker would compare
the available (t-1) ESL value with its previous, (t-2), ESL value to quantify progress
before deciding on education spending for the current time period, t. Consequently,
the additional regressor included in specification (8) is given by: Δlog(ESL)t-1 or,
equivalently, by the difference defined in ESL levels: log(ESL)t-1 – log(ESL)t-2.
 Secondly, for specification (9) in Table 3, I consider that the policy-maker evaluates
the available (t-1) ESL value against a fixed (time-invariant) unobserved country-
specific reference value. Such a reference value could be either a fixed target or an
optimal determined ESL value, though here I include dummy variables to balance
the lack of such country-specific measures over the whole estimation period.22 This
specification, which I label as ‘FE’, also controls for any remaining cross-sectional
heterogeneity not accounted for so far by the ‘full’ model specification. Consequently,
I include log(ESL)t-1 as an additional regressor along with a country-specific dummy.
 Thirdly, I consider that, for a given country, the relevant reference value to measure the
progress registered by its ESL objective is the EU-aggregate ESL value. This specification,
labelled as ‘EU27’, corresponds to column (10) in Table 3. Consequently, the regressor
included in the model is given by the difference between the country-specific ESL and
the EU2723 average ESL, i.e., log(ESL)t-1 – log(ESLEU27)t-1.
In practice, it is more likely that policy-makers rely on a series of benchmarks and
reference values (possibly including the ones employed above, i.e., own lags, specific
targets, EU averages etc.) to evaluate their progress and decide spending allocations
in education. Based on the results displayed in Table 3, there is some weak statis-
tical evidence of policy commitment in specification (9), where dummies were in-
troduced as a proxy for fixed ESL targets. This evidence should be understood
within the limits of the approach considered here. Interestingly, in model (9) the




R2 [eq1] 0.22 0.22
R2 [eq2] 0.14 0.14




Breusch-Pagan test of independence stat. (p-val.) 21.27 (0.00) 38.23 (0.00)
Note: The R2 is just a summary measure of the overall in-sample predictive power of the model; it is simply computed as
1-residual sum of squares/total sum of squared residuals. The null of the Breusch-Pagan tests is that the residuals across
the estimated equations in the model are independent
Standard errors are adjusted for small sample sizes. t statistics are given in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3 Estimates for public education spending per (FTE) student with policy commitment
SUR estimates for the model specifications:












Specification (7) (8) (9) (10)
Δlog (spending per student, FTE, at ISCED 0–1) [eq1]
Δlog (ULC) 1.04*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.04***
(5.29) (5.27) (4.70) (5.22)
Δlog (real GDP per capita) 0.65*** 0.57*** 0.42** 0.62***
(3.57) (3.16) (2.03) (3.36)
Δlog (pupil/teacher ratio) (−1) −0.03 −0.05 0.01 −0.02
(−0.22) (−0.44) (0.05) (−0.18)
Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.05 0.06* 0.05* 0.05
(1.57) (1.83) (1.66) (1.52)
Δlog (share of teachers’ wages expenditure) (−1) 0.37** 0.40** 0.46** 0.37*
(2.00) (2.15) (2.27) (1.93)
[log(ESL) – X] (−1) −0.02 0.09* −0.02
(−0.29) (1.73) (−0.76)
Constant 3.29*** 3.07*** −15.93 3.12***
(3.73) (3.75) (−1.35) (3.62)
Δlog (spending per student, FTE, at ISCED 2–4) [eq2]
Δlog (ULC) 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.48** 0.63***
(3.01) (2.97) (2.08) (2.91)
Δlog (real GDP per capita) 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.51** 0.63***
(3.06) (2.93) (2.26) (3.12)
Δlog (pupil/teacher ratio) (−1) −0.24* −0.26* −0.29** −0.24*
(−1.73) (−1.86) (−2.03) (−1.73)
Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.72) (0.84) (0.75) (0.72)
Δlog (share of teachers’ wages expenditure) (−1) 0.44** 0.42** 0.53** 0.43*
(2.09) (1.97) (2.38) (2.03)
[log(ESL) – X] (−1) 0.05 −0.04 0.03
(0.65) (0.77) (0.86)
Constant 3.05*** 3.04*** 12.56 3.20***
(3.34) (3.28) (0.98) (3.41)
Δlog (spending per student, FTE, at ISCED 5–6) [eq3]
Δlog (ULC) 0.82*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.75***
(3.88) (3.69) (3.37) (3.57)
Δlog (real GDP per capita) 0.49** 0.48** 0.54** 0.49**
(2.48) (2.45) (2.40) (2.50)
Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 0.06*
(1.65) (1.83) (1.52) (1.71)
Δlog (share of teachers’ wages expenditure) (−1) 0.47** 0.48** 0.53** 0.45**
(2.23) (2.35) (2.38) (2.19)
[log(ESL) – X] (−1) −0.01 −0.11* 0.01
(−0.01) (−1.93) (0.42)
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coefficient associated with the commitment proxy is positive for primary education
but negative for tertiary education, meaning that, for example, if previous ESL
values were above a fixed (country-specific) reference value, spending would in-
crease at the primary (including pre-primary) but decrease at the tertiary education
level – a result that makes sense given that the policy objective is expressed in
terms of school dropouts with less than (upper) secondary education. Unfortu-
nately, such weak statistical evidence does not allow me to draw strong conclusions
with respect to policy commitment in this empirical setting. The explanation could
be related to large data heterogeneity issues, most likely due to the presence of
some gross outliers in the sample (see Appendix) or simply because the model
tries to pool together countries with very different policy attitudes. Empirical re-
sults were sensitive to sample length changes, i.e., dropping more than one obser-
vation either from the beginning or from the end of the sample would alter the
coefficients and their statistical significance; a future investigation that could lever-
age on better data availability and span over longer time periods should perhaps
come with more insights and more robust findings. Probably more interesting, the
results were not that sensitive when dropping some of the selected controls that
define the ‘extended’ specification.
4.3 Policy discussion
With public education costs growing faster than aggregate prices, affordability concerns
inevitably arise in any discussion on public education investment. The empirical results
Table 3 Estimates for public education spending per (FTE) student with policy commitment
(Continued)
Constant 0.90 0.96 23.31 0.97
(1.00) (1.09) (1.81) (1.07)
Δlog (general spending per capita) [eq4]
Δlog (ULC) 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.69***
(6.96) (6.83) (6.86) (6.86)
Δlog (real GDP per capita) 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46***
(5.05) (4.85) (4.95) (4.95)
Constant 2.31*** 2.25*** 2.27*** 2.27***
(5.36) (5.21) (5.27) (5.27)
Observations 206 200 203 203
R2 [eq1] 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.22
R2 [eq2] 0.14 0.14 0.26 0.14
R2 [eq3] 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.14
R2 [eq4] 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26
AIC 5774.34 5591.05 5755.20 5693.97
BIC 5840.90 5666.91 6060.01 5770.17
Country dummies No No Yes No
Breusch-Pagan test of independence stat. (p-val.) 38.23 (0.00) 32.98 (0.00) 36.23 (0.00) 37.70 (0.00)
Note: The R2 is just a summary measure of the overall in-sample predictive power of the model; it is simply computed as
1-residual sum of squares/total sum of squared residuals. The null of the Breusch-Pagan tests is that the residuals across
the estimated equations in the model are independent
Country dummies not shown for specification (9)
Standard errors are adjusted for small sample sizes. t statistics are given in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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above have exposed the ‘cost disease’ as a common phenomenon across the EU, espe-
cially at primary and secondary education levels. In the case of higher education in-
stead, the results were more mixed (see Table 1), probably due to the nature of the data
employed in the empirical analysis, which covers only public funding sources but disre-
gards spending by households, philanthropists, international institutions, etc. In
contrast to primary and secondary education, public financial support for tertiary edu-
cation (which is generally not mandatory) covers only a part of total education costs
(with the remaining being filled from private sources). In this context, such mixed re-
sults for tertiary education are not quite unexpected. In fact, some recent policy initia-
tives envisaging a shift in the cost burden from governments to parents and/or
students have been taken mainly with respect to tertiary education funding support
(e.g., via higher tuition fees, fiscal incentives for student loans, etc.). If this trend in pol-
icy changes will continue in the future, it would definitely help to reduce pressure on
public budgets. Some forms of cost-sharing might also arise at lower education levels
like, for example, private tutoring to compensate for poor/insufficient teaching that
usually arises as a consequence of lower public financial support. However, there are
good reasons to expect harder public scrutiny in case these practices become the norm
rather than the exception (the last paragraph in section 2 lists some reference studies
discussing the interaction between education and redistribution policies, and the
preferences of the median-voter).
As already suggested in section 4.1 above, growing labour productivity (at least at a
faster pace than wages so that unit labour costs are kept in check) might be a way to
tackle the ‘cost disease’ problem over the long-term. Indeed, the ‘progressive’ sector can
more efficiently leverage physical capital and technology to deliver overall productivity
gains (despite stagnation in other sectors). However, this productivity-enhancing mech-
anism can be strengthened when human capital (instead of simply labour) enters the
production function of the ‘progressive’ sector. In fact, some recent extensions of the
Baumol model include more positive interactions between the ‘progressive’ and the
‘stagnant’ sectors as a way to achieve better economic outcomes (see Pugno, 2006). The
dual causality link between education and economic development exposes, neverthe-
less, a range of effective policy options in this context. More importantly, it highlights a
mechanism along which better designed policies can incentivize more (or more effi-
cient) human capital accumulation, not only through the consumption of education
services, but also through other forms, such as learning-by-doing, up-skilling, lifelong
learning, etc.
It is important to note that some forms of human capital investment do not necessar-
ily require public financial support (e.g., learning-by-doing), but others do so, and
sometimes to a large extent (besides education, other examples include re-training and
some active labour market policies). From a political economy perspective, and apart
from business cycle influences, it is clear that policy-makers can shift their preferences
between (short-term) redistributive policies (e.g., transfers or subsidies) and policies in-
centivizing (long-term) human capital accumulation. There are probably many difficult
trade-offs here that arise due to seemingly conflicting objectives. Yet, it is not necessar-
ily the size of public spending allocated to a given policy area that this paper is con-
cerned with, but rather the policy-decision process of adjusting/amending spending in
an effort to deliver results on a clear policy mandate. In this context, the weak overall
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empirical evidence found for policy commitment on education could highlight risks as-
sociated with EU economic development prospects. Even if the lack of clear evidence
for commitment is mostly a reflection of large heterogeneity issues in the data, it could
nevertheless raise concerns with respect to real (economic and political) convergence
prospects in Europe.
5 Conclusions
This paper makes two important contributions. Firstly, it uncovers some of the main
economic determinants driving the dynamics of public education spending in a panel
dataset spanning across EU members over the 2000–2012 period. The empirical model
builds mainly on theoretical insights borrowed from Baumol (1967), Baumol and
Bowen (1966), and Bowen (1980). A four-equation system is proposed to resolve the
spending allocation problem inherent in a public budgeting process, with three equa-
tions describing the dynamics of education spending per student (at primary, secondary
and tertiary levels) and a fourth one describing the dynamics of total public spending
in per capita terms. The empirical results provide strong evidence that the costs of pub-
lic education have been rising faster than general prices (proxied here by the aggregate
unit labour costs), despite accounting for growing real income/demand effects (proxied
by GDP per capita). Besides confirming the theories on which the specification of the
model was built, such a finding also exposes, unfortunately, the long-term affordability
challenge of public education investment.
Secondly, the empirical setting above is used to investigate whether policy commit-
ment has been a major determinant driving the dynamics of public education spending
in Europe. I draw on two main policy agendas and select the share of early school
leavers as a relevant policy objective for the EU member states over the whole
2000–2012 period. Then, expanding on the previous model specification, I formulate an
empirical equivalent of a policy rule that would determine how education spending
decisions are related to past progresses in the policy objective. Nonetheless, I find only
weak overall statistical evidence of policy commitment to education across Europe, most
likely due to large heterogeneity issues in the dataset. Moreover, the empirical results
seem to be sensitive to some basic robustness checks.
Finally, it might be worth pointing out some further research directions. A possible
follow-up could attempt to include determinants that draw more heavily on political
economy considerations to reflect changes in political and/or institutional aspects,
different financing mechanisms, or analyse longer time periods (see Busemeyer, 2007).
Moreover, direct extensions of the present analysis of commitment to other policy
domains remain possible, especially in the area of employment and social security,
although a different theoretical background would be required in this case.
Endnotes
1See the official communication of the European Council from March 2000 at http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm
and the conclusions of the European Council from June 2010 at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/115346.pdf.
2As an additional proof of its policy relevance, an ambitious EU-wide target of no
more than 10 % was initially specified, and later reiterated within the Europe 2020
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version together with country-specific targets, in an attempt to enforce more efficient
implementation and accountability.
3How much a government spends on education can be seen as a measure of its com-
mitment to education according to Gylfason (2001). Some existing theoretical studies
address the issue of policy commitment and time-consistent fiscal policy in general, but
with careful considerations with respect to education investment in particular, e.g.,
Boadway et al. (1996), Gradstein (2000), Andersson and Konrad (2003).
4An interesting analysis in the EU context is provided in Dragomirescu-Gaina et al.
(2015), who discuss the positive interactions between labour productivity and education
choices with a long-term perspective.
5Same arguments can be made if one groups public spending on education and
health-care together (as long-term investments in human capital) and contrasts them
with spending on other public policy areas like employment and social security (which
can also be seen as investments in human capital, but from a rather short-term
perspective).
6This can be seen mostly in the significant drop in the relative prices of information-
communication & technology (ICT) equipment (compared to general prices) over the
last decades.
7Besides labour mobility, several other factors might also contribute: nominal rigidi-
ties in setting wages, high unionization levels etc.
8At this point, an interested reader might notice the striking similarities between the
work of Baumol and the parallel research in international economics done by Balassa
(1964) and Samuelson (1964). In a similar modelling setting, two sectors (i.e., the trad-
able and the non-tradable sector) are characterized by different productivity dynamics,
but the convergence of nominal wages later drives domestic inflation higher and gener-
ates real appreciation of the domestic currency.
9This paper uses first-differences of the data, but a very similar approach is employed
in Busemeyer (2007), who uses the residuals from an estimated autoregressive AR(1)
model in levels.
10See Jefferson (2005) for a survey on empirical evidence related to the causality link
between education financing and students’ performances. Two more recent but exten-
sive reviews of the previous literature that are on school and teacher’s characteristics
are Hanushek and Woessmann (2010) and Glewwe et al. (2011).
11For example Gundlach et al. (2001) compute sector-specific productivity in the
education sector based on the results of standardized achievement tests for U.S.
12Heterogeneity might still remain an unsolved issue, despite estimating a model
specification in first-differences that control for time invariant characteristics.
13The inclusion in the regression of the capital expenditures’ share instead of non-
personnel costs’ share (which is the second biggest contributor to total public education
spending) is just a matter of choice. Obviously, one cannot include all three compo-
nents of public education spending due to collinearity concerns. In this case, capital
spending might even provide a clearer interpretation of the results because of its expli-
cit content.
14One can argue (and this would be in line with some existing empirical studies) that
teachers’ age and gender composition are also important determinants of overall educa-
tion spending; yet, data availability was the main drawback for not using more detailed
Dragomirescu-Gaina IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:25 Page 19 of 24
indicators as controls. Also, one should be careful not to overstate the importance of
some qualitative indicators in a time-series analysis; most of these indicators, e.g., de-
scribing schools’ organizational methods or other institutional dimensions, might have
only a one-time effect (see discussion in Wolff et al., 2014) and would therefore not
appear as significant in a time-series regression analysis.
15Please note that this would not represent an empirical formulation of a transmission
mechanism—from spending public resources to reaching specific outcomes—mainly
because the causality in the text above runs backwards.
16The number of FTE pupil/students used to compute the COFOG-based spending
per student at the ISCED 0–1 level correspond only to ISCED 1 pupils, thus excluding
ISCED 0 pupils.
17This is a common finding in empirical studies when the two regressors involved are
correlated. However, in my case, the correlation is not high enough to render any of
the coefficients statistically insignificant. Therefore, I take this as evidence of their
different content and significance in explaining the dynamics of education spending.
18In principle, the share of teachers’ wages in education spending would reflect the
sensitive balance that governments need to strike between human (e.g., teachers) and
physical capital (e.g., schools) when it comes to allocating public funds.
19Although not explicitly treated here, education quality might be an important elem-
ent in the policy discussion. Still, it remains an open question whether consistent (as
opposed to one-time) improvements in education quality are possible at all (see Wolff
et al., 2014). Meanwhile, there is plenty of space to improve the existing quantitative
measures of education attainment, such as ESL.
20A never-ending quest for lower ESL values would be inefficient and waste import-
ant financial resources when policy-makers face an allocation problem and different
policy objectives. Moreover, given the increased efforts to foster mobility across EU
countries (e.g., ERASMUS+), most differences between countries should be mitigated
through migration or internationalization of education over the long-run. In light of
these arguments, ‘policy commitment’ appears also in the reverse situation when spend-
ing is reduced if the progress is satisfactory, thus facilitating a linear interpretation of
the model.
21Historically, some EU countries have consistently registered very low ESL values
over the 2000–2012 period, among them: AT, CZ, DK, FI, HR, LT, PL, SE, SI and SK.
Other members such as CY, DE, FR, IE, LU and NL have managed to reach single-digit
ESL levels only over the most recent years (i.e., 2010–2012). The rest of the EU mem-
bers (representing about half of the total EU28) were still above the 10 % EU-wide tar-
get as of 2012.
22Europe 2020 agenda has introduced country-specific targets for ESL. However,
these targets were adopted after the year 2010 (though at different moments) and were
therefore not available for most of the period under consideration here. Only as an
exercise, I have used the deviations from these politically ‘announced’ country-specific
targets, but the results were not significant (result are available from the author). If
anything, this highlights the lack of relevance (both political and empirical) of the an-
nounced targets, thus supporting the use of a series of reference values in the present
evaluation of policy commitment.
23I use EU27 averages since data availability for EU28 is severely limited.
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Appendix
This appendix presents a sensitivity check of the estimated model coefficients displayed
for both specifications (4) and (7) in Table 2. This sensitivity check addresses hetero-
geneity concerns with respect to countries included in the sample and consists in esti-
mating the same model specification, but excluding one country at a time. The
resulting ‘shadow coefficients’ are plotted in the figure below, where the x-axis lists the
excluded country. The advantages of a four-equation system can be most clearly ex-
posed using a simple standard deviation measure to reflect the departure of the ‘shadow
coefficients’ from the ones reported in specifications (4) or (7). What is probably less
clear in the figure, but becomes evident when displaying the raw standard deviations
(henceforth sdev.) of the ‘shadow coefficients’, is that the outliers now play a less
important role (though the bias in the estimated coefficients cannot be entirely elimi-
nated). The three-equation system exhibits a sdev. of 5.94, 4.29 and 3.44% for the
‘shadow coefficients associated with ULCs in equations 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and
4.02, 5.82 and 3.75% for GDP per capita. Similarly, the four-equation system exhibits a
sdev. of 5.46, 4.19 and 3.12% for ULCs in equations 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and 3.73,
5.77 and 3.59% for GDP per capita.
Moreover, the figure above suggests that the overall sample might contain some gross
outliers (which seem to introduce a bias in the estimated coefficients) such as: BG, CY,
CZ, GR, HU, LT, LV, MT, RO, and SI. These findings are not surprising since some of
these countries have suffered harsh adjustments in their fiscal policies, including their
public expenditures: RO, LT and LV implemented broad austerity programs negotiated
with the international financial institutions, mostly in 2010 (the 25% cut in public
wages in RO and LV, and the 15% cut in LT have mostly affected education, health-care
and other related public sectors with large employment shares). Others such as GR,
and to a smaller extent HU, have been among the countries that required international
financial assistance in the aftermath of the recent global economic and European sover-
eign crisis. Countries such as ES, IE, IT, and PT have also benefited from different
forms of EU financial support, but these countries do not seem to bias the estimated
‘shadow coefficients’ according to the figure above. However, most (if not all) EU
members have undertaken some adjustments in their public spending policies over
the recent periods, especially as a consequence of the sovereign crisis that has
increased the pressure on public finances across the board.
Just as an illustration of the possible effects introduced in the model by the outliers
identified above and/or the recent European sovereign crisis, I depart from
Fig. 1 Sensitivity check of model coefficients when one country is removed from the sample
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Table 4 Alternative estimates for public education spending per (FTE) student – tackling outliers








Specification (4.i) (4.ii) (7.i) (7.ii)
Δlog (spending per student, FTE,
at ISCED 0–1) [eq1]
Δlog (ULC) 0.95*** 0.88*** 0.96*** 0.88***
(4.61) (3.93) (4.65) (3.94)
Δlog (real GDP per capita) 0.55*** 0.90*** 0.56*** 0.92***
(2.83) (3.32) (2.87) (3.37)
Δlog (pupil/teacher ratio) (−1) −0.11 −0.09 −0.02 −0.03
(−0.82) (−0.66) (−0.16) (−0.27)
Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(1.67) (1.59) (1.74) (1.62)
Δlog (share of teachers’ wages
expenditure) (−1)
0.53*** 0.36* 0.44** 0.31
(2.64) (1.83) (2.25) (1.62)
Constant 8.16** 2.78 8.03** 2.90
(2.53) (0.75) (2.49) (0.78)
Δlog (spending per student, FTE,
at ISCED 2–4) [eq2]
Δlog (ULC) 0.47** 0.42* 0.48** 0.43*
(2.15) (1.74) (2.17) (1.74)
Δlog (real GDP per capita) 0.49** 0.82*** 0.49** 0.83***
(2.38) (2.76) (2.40) (2.78)
Δlog (pupil/teacher ratio) (−1) −0.36** −0.26** −0.31** −0.23*
(−2.54) (−1.78) (−2.23) (−1.65)
Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01
(1.07) (0.35) (1.08) (0.35)
Δlog (share of teachers’ wages
expenditure) (−1)
0.54** 0.44** 0.49** 0.43**
(2.51) (2.08) (2.31) (1.99)
Constant 7.11** −0.89 7.04** −0.84
(2.08) (−0.22) (2.06) (−0.21)
Δlog (spending per student, FTE,
at ISCED 5–6) [eq3]
Δlog (ULC) 0.86*** 0.77*** 0.86*** 0.77***
(3.81) (3.15) (3.81) (3.15)
Δlog (real GDP per capita) 0.45** 0.72** 0.45** 0.72**
(2.12) (2.46) (2.12) (2.46)
Δlog (share of capital expenditure) (−1) 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04
(1.60) (1.22) (1.60) (1.22)
Δlog (share of teachers’ wages
expenditure) (−1)
0.53** 0.53** 0.54** 0.53**
(2.42) (2.48) (2.47) (2.48)
Constant 1.59 −0.45 1.59 −0.45
(0.45) (−0.11) (0.45) (−0.11)
Δlog (general govt. spending
per capita) [eq4]
Δlog (ULC) 0.69*** 0.53***
(6.30) (4.67)
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specifications (4) and (7) from Table 2 and illustrate four additional specifications that
include: (i) country-specific dummies, but only for the list of nominated outliers above,
i.e., BG, CY, CZ, GR, HU, LT, LV, MT, RO, SI, and (ii) time dummies that cover the
whole estimation period. The alternative specifications are labeled (4.i), (4.ii), (7.i) and
(7.ii) and are displayed in Table 4 below. Two main findings are worth mentioning here.
Firstly, as expected, correcting for outliers has generated an overall increase in the ex-
planatory power of the empirical model (as captured by the R2), especially at the ISCED
0–1 and ISCED 2–4 levels. Secondly, the coefficients associated with ULCs and GDP
per capita have remained statistically significant across all the alternative specifications,
and this is a strong confirmation for the importance of the economic determinants
identified in section 2.
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of European Labor Studies is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The
author declares that he/she has observed these principles.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Leandro Elia, the editor (Sara de la Rica) and an anonymous reviewer of this journal for
comments and suggestions that helped me streamline the analysis presented here. Comments from Stan van Alphen
and Lene Mejer on a preliminary version of this paper are also acknowledged. Obviously, the usual disclaimer applies
and all the remaining errors are mine. The paper builds and expands on a work project that started during my stay at
the Econometrics and Applied Statistics Unit, DG Joint Research Centre, European Commission.
Responsible editor: Sara de la Rica
Received: 4 July 2015 Accepted: 12 November 2015
Table 4 Alternative estimates for public education spending per (FTE) student – tackling outliers
(Continued)




Observations 206 206 206 206
R2 [eq1] 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.31
R2 [eq2] 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.22
R2 [eq3] 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.22
R2 [eq4] 0.29 0.37
AIC 4567.29 4564.37 5799.84 5779.91
BIC 4723.70 4730.77 5999.51 5992.89
Country dummies for selected countries Yes - Yes -
Joint Wald-type test for dummies (at 5%) eq2 eq2
Year dummies - Yes - Yes
Joint Wald-type test for dummies (at 5%) eq1 eq1
Breusch-Pagan test of independence
stat. (p-val.)
22.11 (0.00) 19.49 (0.00) 38.15 (0.00) 30.34 (0.00)
Note: The R2 is just a summary measure of the overall in-sample predictive power of the model; it is simply computed as
1-residual sum of squares/total sum of squared residuals. The null of the Breusch-Pagan tests is that the residuals across
the estimated equations in the model are independent. For the joint Wald-type test, the table indicates the equation for
which the null was rejected at the 5% level (meaning that dummies were jointly and statistically significant)
Country and year dummies are not shown
Standard errors are adjusted for small sample sizes. t statistics are given in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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